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Asked to comment briefly on the preceding exchange of
views, I quickly decided that the role of referee would be both
presumptuous and unnecessary. Esherick’s points are clearly
stated, and the authors are quite able to speak for themselves.
The reader can best judge the differences by resorting to the
books and articles at issue. One virtue of this sort of exchange is
the stimulus it gives to reading (or rereading) with fresh
questions in mind the important literature on the subject.
Instead of attempting reconciliations, I shall make a few
points of my own on two general issues around which a number
of remarks by both Esherick and his respondents cluster.
The question of the role in the late Qing and the 1911 1
Revolution of the republican revolutionary movement remains
with us. I have long been sympathetic with the effort to escape
from an interpretation of the Revolution preoccupied with Sun
Yat-sen’s activities. I believe that the view from the localities
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and provinces is an important corrective to narratives focused
on the leading personalities in the Tongmenghui.
However, in our reaction to the cult of Sun or the &dquo;orthodox
school,&dquo; we might let the pendulum swing farther than is
reasonable. While denying control or internal cohesion to the
leading revolutionary party, we need not simultaneously deny it
its ideological, propagandistic, and organizational contributions.
An important determinant of the form of the 1911 Revolution
(although decentralized, it was remarkably uniform, including
republican commitments and military governments in the
provinces) was the groundwork laid by the republican revolu-
tionary movement. For all their factionalism and tenuousness of
control, the Tongmenghui group were leading contenders for
national power in 1912 and 1913. That they failed to achieve it
is a measure of their limitations as a political force. But it does
not prove the force to have been negligible.
Once the question was, why did the famous leaders of the
Revolution not administer the successor state? Perhaps the
interpretive problem is now reversed: given the weakness of the
national revolutionary organization at the time of the Revolu-
tion and its marginality to so many of the main events, how
does one explain its considerable influence after the Revolution
and the anxiety with which its challenge was regarded by its
chief enemies, for example, Yuan Shi-kai and Liang Qi-chao?
As with the investigation of the revolutionary period from
the perspective of local and provincial history, the pursuit of
this question will likely lead to consideration of the social
content t of the Revolution. One of the strengths of Harold
Schiffrin’s study of Sun Yat-sen is its attention to the social
context of Sun’s ideas and to the relationship between changes
in those ideas and Sun’s changing alliances with different,
potentially anti-Qing, social groups. Generally speaking, liter-
ature published in America and England lags far behind that of
China or Japan in examining the social basis and consequences
of the 1911 Revolution. Now that the examination has begun
here, however, we may expect a lengthy debate, more likely to
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be terminated by exhaustion than consensus. This prospect in
no way diminishes the importance of the effort; on the
contrary, it bespeaks the centrality of the problem for an
understanding of modern Chinese history.
Let us consider the question of the augmentation of gentry
power through the Revolution, a matter touched upon by
Esherick and several respondents. Esherick and Rhoads assert
the fact of increased gentry power and, at least implicitly, its
importance for understanding the Revolution and its aftermath.
Gasster objects to the proposition, both because it belittles the .
Revolution and the changes it represented and because it
neglects the long-term trend of gentry decline. For Elvin, the
&dquo;long-term&dquo; comes within months of the Revolution: gentry
power was &dquo;in many respects&dquo; at its nemesis in 1912-1914.1
Both Gasster’s and Elvin’s objections seem related to a
preference for a finer segmentation within social categories and
for focusing on new social or occupational groups.
Although Elvin seems to view the 1911 Revolution itself as at
least partly a reaction against modernization, he and Gasster
emphasize the &dquo;economic, intellectual, and social trans-
formation&dquo; (Elvin) or the &dquo;vast social revolution&dquo; (Gasster)
inaugurated between the 1890s and the May Fourth Movement.
While old hierarchies and privileges (that is, the gentry position)
were being destroyed, a new, modem order (represented by the
new occupations) was taking their place. Gentry domination of
the Revolution has no place here; or the Revolution itself must
be separated out as a somewhat anti-modem, but short-lived,
episode in a forward, modernizing movement.
It is not easy to escape from the feeling that to assert gentry
domination or usurpation of the Revolution is to rob a major
event of significance. Indeed, those who assert it, like Esherick
and Rhoads, allow a basis for a degree of forward movement .
through the identification of a separated and relatively pro-
gressive segment of the gentry: a &dquo;new gentry&dquo; (Rhoads) or an
&dquo;urban reformist elite&dquo; (Esherick in his dissertation). By
hypothesizing a split in the elite, attributing nationalistic
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motivations to one part of it (the national and provincial elite),
and denying them to the other (the local elite), Esherick in his
essay here lays the basis for a politically progressive result
accompanying a socially regressive revolution.
Although eschewing the word &dquo;gentry&dquo; for the period of the
Revolution, Rankin seems to be critical of emphasis on a split
elite. She objects to distinctions based on motivation. This
point raises the question: can the provincial and reformist
gentry be characterized as less self-interested and more idealistic
than the local gentry? If the answer is &dquo;no,&dquo; then the politically
progressive aspect of the 1911 Revolution would seem to have
lost its social grounding. In a second objection to the hypothesis
of a split elite, Rankin writes that the social changes accom-
panying the emergence of reformism leaders &dquo;did not normally
involve a strong break with traditional patterns, nor did they
weaken the hold of pervasive native-place and clan ties.&dquo; The
suggestion is that the elite had not yet socially split in 1911.
This chain of discourse could, of course, be broken at any
point with objections or embellishments. But I should like to
observe two conceptual issues that seem to me relevant here.
The first is the distinction between social segmentation and
social movement. New activities and enterprises developed in
China, especially from the 1890s, that seem from our present-
day perspective to be quite distinct by virtue of their
&dquo;nontraditional&dquo; aspect. Hence we are inclined to assign large
social significance to their emergence and too easily jump to the
conclusion that political change must be grounded in the new
social segments. But in the period of the 1911 1 Revolution,
when people joined together outside the government to affect
politics and thereby formed movements, the definition of the
recruiting pool was more often the old social categories than the
new occupations. And it understandably would be so, since
only in the New Army, in the new schools, and among overseas
Chinese would the numbers and resources of the new groups be
sufficient. When it comes to the intersection between society
and politics in this period, we should note the new groups. But
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we cannot neglect the central importance of categories like
peasant, merchant, and gentry, no matter how many segments
can be delineated within each.
True, so much that was new was happening in politics from
the 1890s onwards. Was this activity compatible with a largely
inherited class structure? I think the matter can best be
understood in terms of a dynamic model of class behavior. That
a social class (with all its segments) behaved and defined its
interests in a certain way in the 1870s does not necessarily
mean that both behavior and definition of interests cannot have
changed considerably by 1910, especially in view of changing
educational and communication structures. Old social groups
undertook new activities, influenced by new ideas and new
perceptions of class interest. Idealism and self-interest con-
verged.
Similarly, it is by no means clear that the large social chasm
between city and countryside that marks later decades had
grown by 1911 1 much beyond what it had long been. When
Esherick cites David Buck on the widening rural-urban gap, the
remark refers in the original to the 1930s. Processes that were
leading toward such a gap may perhaps have been set in motion
around the time of the 1911 Revolution or even earlier. But I
believe they were not sufficiently mature in 1911 to have been
major influences on the Revolution.
Even if a politically significant split in the social elite cannot
be defined, however, one need not relegate the 1911 Revolution
to the category of nonevent. The limitations of the Revolution
and the fragility of the new order may have arisen from the
predominantly elitist character of the social base. On the other
hand, a heightened political cohesiveness within the gentry elite,
despite its social segmentation, may help explain the historic
achievement of the overthrow of the ancient imperial order.
NOTE
1. My reading of some of the sources Elvin cites for this view has left me with a
different conclusion. The social disorder in the countryside during 1912 and 1913
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was a symptom of the consolidation of gentry power rather than a sign of its demise.
Mass armies, mobilized during the Revolution, turned (or returned) partly to
banditry when demobilized, and were thereby transformed from social threats to
familiar nuisances. As Rankin observes here, the effort to deal with this social
turbulence and protest distracted the elite from "innovation," but the effort was
socially reinforcing for the gentry. Meanwhile, widespread gentry absorption of local
governmental powers added to gentry social weight.
